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A Soft Solution for a Hard Problem:
Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Post-Conflict Societies
James D. McGinley*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of war, justice will not wait for institutions.
In anarchy, there is opportunity, but more importantly, there is opportunistic
excess that thrives in a lawless vacuum unhindered by civil constraint.1 This
is the quintessential Hobbesian moment where life is “nasty, brutish, and
short.”2 The backbone of any attempt at reestablishing civil society is the
reconstruction of a respected judiciary, but this takes time—and life will not
wait. It is against this backdrop, which often seems to more closely

* Partner (1996-2007), Of Counsel (2008-2015), Hiepler & Hiepler; Colonel, United States
Marine Corps, Retired; J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law (1991); LL.M. National Security
Law and Certificate International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CIADR), Georgetown
University Law Center (2014). As the Lead Litigation Partner, his trial work has been featured with
a cover story for Time magazine, and the lead story for CBS news production 60 Minutes. Colonel
James D. McGinley retired from the Marine Corps after three combat tours and thirty years of
service. As a naval aviator, he commanded HMH-769, the Titans, a CH-53E squadron. In 2004,
Colonel McGinley was selected to serve on The Joint Staff at the Pentagon. In 2006, he deployed to
Iraq, serving as the inaugurating Director of the al Anbar Provincial Joint Coordination Center. In
May 2008, Colonel McGinley returned to Iraq for a one-year combat tour as the Deputy
Commander/Chief of Staff of the Iraq Assistance Group, leading Coalition Force efforts to train,
mentor, and advise Iraqi Security Forces. In his third and final combat tour, Colonel McGinley
served as the Deputy Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group Five (FIFTH Fleet), conducting full
spectrum expeditionary maritime operations in support of U.S. Central Command.
Colonel
McGinley’s combat decorations include the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star.
1. DENNIS A. RONDINELLI, THE CHALLENGES OF RESTORING GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS AND
POST-CONFLICT
COUNTRIES
1-7
(2007),
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/un/unpan025512.pdf.
2. THOMAS HOBBES, Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning Their Felicity,
and Misery, in LEVIATHAN (1651), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207h.htm#link2HCH0013.
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resemble a scene from a Mad Max movie3 than anything we know of reality,
that Alternative Dispute Resolution may present the best hope for equitable
solutions.4
Depending on the type of dispute resolution techniques, their cultural
acceptance, and the skill of implementation, there is a strong potential to
dramatically increase the speed of stabilization by resolving differences
before they lead to additional strife in an already chaotic environment. It is
this combination of simplicity, efficiency, and light footprint that makes
Alternative Dispute Resolution a potentially powerful tool in post-kinetic
environments.
The kinetic phase of warfare reduces life for both combatants and noncombatants to its barest element of mere survival. Part II of this article will
focus on the environment in the immediate aftermath of the kinetic phase as
a shattered society faces anarchy, a vacuum regarding the Rule of Law5 and
destructive opportunistic behaviors.
Although different cultures may have disparate traditions of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, they all have as their goal the need to find acceptable
solutions to significant disagreements. Part III will examine the key
approaches to alternative dispute resolution, with a brief survey of
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Importantly, the article will also
consider the need to evaluate the use of indigenous dispute resolution
methods that may vary substantially from established Western practices.
Modernly, there has been a greater focus on traditional Rule of Law
efforts, specifically because of the need to create a high degree of confidence
that justice will prevail in the formation of new institutions.6 After basic
needs for survival have been met, this next step of resolving disputes is
critical to establishing stability.
However, it is important to contrast the limitations of transitional
justice, and its focus on criminal adjudication, with the need for civil justice
as society strives to reestablish the foundation of the activities of daily
living. Part IV will examine the challenges presented by the extensive
process of recreating a judiciary, selecting judges, training staff, and
building facilities. It will also contemplate the consequences of approaches
that simply reach back to pre-conflict norms, in spite of being very time
3. Robert Firsching, Mad Max (1979) NYT Critics’ Pick, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/movies/movie/30657/Mad-Max/overview.
4. The key techniques of Alternative Dispute Resolution that will be considered are
indigenous dispute resolution, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
5. “Rule of Law” is capitalized as a proper noun to describe formal Rule of Law initiatives
undertaken to reestablish governance in post-conflict societies. See UNITED NATIONS SEC.
COUNCIL, THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT
SOCIETIES:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 4 (2004), http://www.ipu.org/splze/unga07/law.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004].
6. See infra Part IV.
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consuming, and risk being perceived as yet another competitor for scarce
governmental resources. This part points out that a simple reach back
approach may be ill-suited to a full spectrum of conflict resolution, with
little buy-in from unstable populations, and may test their patience to the
extent of aggravating instability.
The success of any transitional effort depends on the skill, knowledge,
and expertise of the personnel who are tasked with implementing Rule of
Law initiatives and their mission readiness. This is especially true where
there has been a severe breakdown in the foundations of civil society, or
where there is still an extremely high threat of physical violence.7
Part V will address coalition force capacity to cope with these
challenges by providing trained facilitators and critical manpower support.
Active component military attorneys, like members of the Judge Advocate
General’s (JAG) Corps, often do not have any specialty training or
experience in Alternative Dispute Resolution, and yet, they provide the most
immediate legal resource to the commander in the combat zone.
Part V will also suggest that coalition manpower management
specialists should plan to source Reserve component attorneys with
Alternative Dispute Resolution specialization, other attorneys from the State
Department or equivalent coalition ministries, and trained negotiators to fill
this critical gap. Planners will also have to build force packages with
sufficient security resources to source safe movement and operations
throughout the battle space.
Typically, this will require transport
helicopters, armored vehicles, associated logistic support packages, and gun
teams to man personal security detachments for the movement of key
Alternative Dispute Resolution personnel.
The capacity of post-kinetic development is always dependent on the
threat environment and must take into consideration the conditions on the
ground in setting realistic goals to evaluate successful progress. Part VI will
explore a spectrum of transition scenarios matching resources to
requirements and focusing on personnel that provide the best results in a
given threat environment. These scenarios include: “hot conflict” (still too
dangerous for anyone but uniformed personnel),8 a transitional threat

7. See infra Part V.
8. In her concept paper for the World Health Organization, Judith Large defines “hot
conflict” more conceptually, stating: “Hot conflict refers to the outbreak of violence, heated
exchanges, riots or organised armed attack.” Judith Large, Considering Conflict, Humanitarian
Health Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 1997), http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/
hbp/considering_conflict/en/. Here, “hot conflict” is used to indicate armed combat with major
combat operations, as opposed to small, sporadic outbreaks of localized violence. Id.
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environment (safe enclave, but defined by ungoverned battle space and
perilous movement), and a steady state permissive environment (safe
enclaves and diminished threat allowing ready movement with minimal
additional security required).
Importantly, Part VII provides several significant insights about the
potential to optimize techniques to typical disputes, and considers these
methods in the context of difficult transition challenges. In particular, it
includes a discussion of specific Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques
and advantages in key situations, and posits an optimization matrix as a
quick decision reference for battlefield commanders. This analysis is also
meant to provide a foundation for planners who may have to develop an
interagency Request for Forces (RFF) to support the Combatant
Commander’s requirement for Alternative Dispute Resolution resources as
part of broader stabilization efforts. In essence, if the sourcing and
deployment of Alternative Dispute Resolution resources is meticulously
executed, then the Combatant Commander’s success in transition will be
dramatically increased.
Finally, Part VIII concludes by focusing on the critical importance of
the need to train like we fight by offering the suggestion that each part of the
system should be gamed and exercised as an integral part of post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction.9 Critical to this effort is the realization that
these issues transcend strictly military manpower and resources, and should
properly be seen as “whole of government” issues drawing on interagency
sourcing from across all of the resources available from coalition partners.
This not only broadens the aperture but also allows multi-disciplinary and
multi-agency solutions to better fit the entire spectrum of issues that confront
coalition efforts to reestablish civil society.
II. BACKGROUND OF ISSUES CONFRONTING COALITION FORCES IN THE
IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF KINETIC PHASE
Although it can be difficult to describe or quantify the immediate chaos
of life in war torn communities, anyone who has seen the pictures10 of

9. In its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, the United
Nations contextually defines the post-conflict environment thusly: “The post-conflict environment
in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) usually take place is often
characterized by “poor or badly functioning economies, . . . insecurity and lawlessness,” and “a lack
of social services and social cohesion.”
UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS § 2.20 (2006), http://unddr.org/uploads/
documents/IDDRS%202.20%20Postconflict%20Stabilization%20and%20Peace-building.pdf.
10. The classic images of the bombing of Dresden, or more currently, the rubble of destroyed
buildings in Syria readily convey the utter destruction of war. See Violence in Syria, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/photos/violence-in-syria.
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destruction can readily understand the almost insurmountable problems
caused by kinetic11 operations.
A. Anarchy
In the immediate aftermath of armed conflict, societies experience a
vacuum of social order that can be every bit as destructive and lethal as the
hostilities that proceeded it. During the spring of 2003 in Iraq, looting and
violence became widespread and were followed by an even more
devastating insurgency.12 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, war
raged from 1998-2002.13 However, even after a peace agreement was
reached, the Congolese suffered an estimated 2.1 million additional deaths
following the formal end of the war.14 The peril of lawlessness is affirmed
in the Geneva Declaration report, The Global Burden of Armed Violence,
noting, “Even more problematic, in some post-conflict settings experiencing
fragmentation and division, armed violence can take on more anarchic
characteristics.”15
B. Rule of Law Vacuum
Post-conflict environments create a vacuum for the rule of law. This
breakdown of civil society presses humanity to the limit with all of the
excesses of unbridled lawlessness.16 The entire range of criminal conduct
including murder, sexual violence, theft, and intimidation can become the
norm.17 There is often a deep-rooted mistrust of fledgling judicial systems,
which may be viewed as corrupt or merely an instrument of revenge or

11. W.J. HURLEY ET AL., NON-KINETIC CAPABILITIES FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE: FOUR CASE
STUDIES, at ES-1 (2009), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA501354 (“‘Kinetic’ capabilities focus on
destroying enemy forces through the application of physical effects.”).
12. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROGER P. HEDGEPETH, AVOIDING THE LEVIATHAN: A STRATEGY
TO
LIMIT POST-CONFLICT NORMATIVE BREAKDOWN 1 (2013), www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589280.
13. GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 52 (2008),
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf
(citing International Rescue Committee (IRC) data).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 54.
16. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], GLOBAL PROGRAMME ON STRENGTHENING
THE RULE OF LAW IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS: ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 4
(2011).
17. Id. at 9.
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retribution.18 Finally, it can be very difficult to harness military and security
institutions that have been dominant in society during conflict and now are
opposed to relinquishing absolute power in order to accommodate the
balance required by the rule of law.19
C. Opportunistic Behaviors
Displaced populations are likely to return to “squatters” who have
seized land, confiscated personal property, and seek to dominate essential
resources like access to electricity and potable water.20 These returning
refugees have immediate needs for food, water, and shelter, which create
opportunities for criminal enterprises to extort these vulnerable populations
as they try to survive the resettlement process. It is also a turbulent time
without established institutions to provide stability and order, and to
constrain criminal behaviors that prey on the most physically vulnerable
returnees.
III. KEY APPROACHES TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Ordinarily, transitional justice environments focus on remedies for
criminal conduct that has occurred in the context of hostilities.21 As a result,
Alternative Dispute Resolution methods frequently used in civil disputes are
often less familiar to Rule of Law practitioners whose emphasis is criminal
justice. Although, an in-depth review of Alternative Dispute Resolution
techniques is beyond the scope of this article, the brief survey that follows
will provide the reader with the necessary foundation to understand the use
of Alternative Dispute Resolution as the best post-conflict interim solution.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. PATRICIA WEISS FAGEN, REFUGEES AND IDPS AFTER CONFLICT: WHY THEY DO NOT GO
HOME 6 (2011). The United Nations’ programs consistently cite land disputes as recurring issues.
According to the UNDP, “At the same time, return movements can trigger disputes over land, water
and property, and open opportunities of economic exploitation. This, in turn, can aggravate existing
problems of legal illiteracy, unemployment, marginalised and weakened statutory structures and
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.” UNDP, STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN CRISISAFFECTED AND FRAGILE SITUATIONS 9 (2011), http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/
dam/rbas/doc/Crisis%20prevention/Global%20Programme%20Phase%20II%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
21. The United Nations provides the following definition of Transitional Justice:
For the United Nations, transitional justice is the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.
Transitional justice processes and mechanisms are a critical component of the United
Nations framework for strengthening the rule of law.
UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: U.N. APPROACH TO
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 2 (2010) [hereinafter U.N. APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE].
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A. Indigenous Dispute Resolution
The Western focus of coalition forces carries with it the risk of
overlooking the obvious preference for Indigenous Dispute Resolution’s use
in areas where local legal traditions provide a ready scheme for resolving
disputes. It is also important to note, that often Indigenous Dispute
Resolution may involve some or all of the techniques embodied in
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
For example, in Arab traditions the rituals of sulh and musalaha focus
on group reconciliation, even for individual wrongs:
The ritual process of sulh usually ends in a public ceremony of
musalaha performed in the village square. The families of both the
victim and the guilty party line up on both sides of the road and
exchange greetings and accept apologies, especially the aggrieved
party. The ceremony includes four major stages: 1) the act of
reconciliation itself; 2) the two parties shake hands under the
supervision of the muslihs or jaha; 3) the family of the murderer
visits the home of the victim to drink a cup of bitter coffee; and 4)
the ritual concludes with a meal hosted by the family of the
offender. The specific form of the rituals varies from
Israel/Palestine to Lebanon and Jordan, but the basic philosophy is
based on sulh, musalaha, musafaha (hand-shaking), and mumalaha
(“partaking of salt and bread,” i.e., breaking bread together). While
sulh resembles contemporary Western approaches to mediation and
arbitration, a key difference is the relationship of the process to
enduring communal relationships. Sulh does not merely take place
between individuals, but between groups.22
The specific benefit of looking to an indigenous solution is that it allows
greater involvement of indigenous populations in the entire dispute
resolution process, creating a sense of control and investment in the
outcome. This, in turn, can be expected to increase the confidence of the
larger community that disputes are being promptly and fairly resolved.
Finally, to the extent that each resolution is a product of local culture,
traditions, and mores, it is more likely to be embraced as a final solution to

22. George E. Irani, Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long- Term Peace in the
Middle
East,
PALESTINE-ISR.
J.
POL.
ECON.
&
CULTURE
(2000),
http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=994.
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provide a genuine answer to the underlying dispute so the parties can
permanently put their differences behind them.23
Moreover, internationally, there is a greater expectation from coalition
partners that local solutions from indigenous populations will be given due
consideration. This notion is reflected in Article 40 of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision
through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and
disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies
for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such
a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions,
rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and
international human rights.24
B. Negotiation
Negotiation, in one form or another, has extraordinary universality
because it forms the basis of bargaining in the marketplace. Ideally, this
good faith approach to meeting, discussing issues in dispute, and proposing
acceptable solutions will result in ultimate resolution.25 However, because
negotiation styles, expectations, and norms are so deeply engrained in
culture, the local parties to the dispute should play the dominate role rather
than introducing the additional barriers of cultural misunderstanding from an
outsider.26

23. The Australian Capital Territory sets out the following aims for its Indigenous Sentencing
Courts in working with Aboriginal populations:
Involve Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in the sentencing process[;]
Increase the confidence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities[;] Reduce
barriers between Courts and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities[;] Provide
culturally relevant and effective sentencing options for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander offenders[;] Provide the offender concerned with support services that will assist
the offender to overcome his or her offending behavior[;] Provide support to victims of
crime and enhance the rights and place of victims in the sentencing process[;] Reduce
repeat offending in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities.
Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a Theoretical and
Jurisprudential Model, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 415, 432 (2007).
24. UNITED NATIONS, GUIDELINE ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ ISSUES 56 (2009).
25. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 50 (3d ed. 2005).
26. Researchers who focus on the impact of culture in the context of negotiation expectations
observe:
Another application of the theory is in understanding differences between intracultural
and intercultural negotiations. Negotiators from the same culture, exposed to the same
public cultural elements, will have a common set of chronically accessible constructs—
self-conceptions, metaphors, expectations, and scripts—making for an “organized”
interaction. Not so in intercultural conflicts, which inherently involve two negotiations,
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Negotiation styles are often broken down into two distinct approaches:
competitive and cooperative negotiation.27 In competitive bargaining, the
negotiator often opens the negotiation with an extreme endpoint to shift the
eventual midpoint of resolution in his favor.28 The basic outlook is seen as a
linear zero sum game, with all gains resulting in an attendant loss for the
opposing party.29 Importantly, this adversarial approach to negotiation
naturally introduces a controlling element of mistrust by both parties.30
In contrast, the cooperative bargaining approach sets a more
constructive foundation with a more moderate opening demand and seeks to
find a cooperative solution.31 Concessions are seen as a vehicle to build
momentum,32 even if it comes at a price of a less favorable result. The fact
that the dispute is resolved may be every bit as important as the ultimate
terms of the settlement. Often, the issue of the dispute is less important than
maintaining a strong, continuing relationship between the parties.33
These contrasting styles are extremely important in post-conflict
environments because desperation can evoke competitive negotiation just
when more cooperative approaches would help build or preserve
relationships, and help to ease any mistrust between the parties.
C. Mediation
At its essence, mediation uses the good offices of a third party specialist
(mediator) to guide and facilitate the parties as their settlement discussions
progress to resolution.34 By its very nature, mediation is enormously

the original conflict over resources and the meta-level negotiation over the meanings that
should define the event.
Michael W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive Dynamics: Expanding
the Cognitive Perspective on Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 65
(Michele
J.
Gelfand
et
al.,
eds.,
2004),
http://www.libvolume7.xyz/psychology/
bsc/semester6/managingbehaviorinorganizations/powerconflictandnegotiation/powerconflictandnego
tiationnotes2.pdf.
27. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 51-52. For a more expansive treatment of negotiation theory
and strategy, see generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
28. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 51.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 52.
32. Id.
33. Id. See also CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM
SOLVING 89-100 (2006).
34. TANIA SOURDIN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 26 (2d ed. 2005).
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flexible and can be broadly adapted to address the variables of disparate
cultures, varying issues, and independent personalities.
1. Models
Scholars in the field look to explain different mediation approaches as
the result of analytical models that differentiate each style based on the
underlying concept of the mediation.35 For example, in the Facilitation
Model, the mediator serves as a conduit, gathering relevant facts and
information, and then delivers the information to the opposing party.36 Here,
the emphasis is on letting the parties work through their differences, with the
potential buffer of the mediator in constructively presenting the
information.37
Usually, the parties are physically separated during this phase, and the
mediator is able to calm the message with a careful selection of words and a
constructive emotional attitude. This may be the most important part of the
mediator’s role because it helps to diffuse the tension and provides the best
opportunity for each party to objectively evaluate the substance of an offer,
rather than being offended by the tone.
In contrast, in the Formulation Model, the mediator is expected to take
part in the substance of the dispute.38 In this model, the mediator is an active
participant in developing new solutions, but refrains from actually
advocating a particular solution.39 It is these substantive contributions that
differentiate the Formulation Model from the mediator’s role as a mere
facilitator.
In the Manipulation Model, the mediator is expected to go beyond the
role of formulator and use all the advantages of power and leverage to
“manipulate” the parties into a resolution.40 Here, the choice of labels is
unfortunate because it implies something sinister; when in practice, it
actually can be extremely helpful to the parties to have an active participant
in finding resolution. In the end, it is still up to the disputing parties to
voluntarily accept or reject the ultimate solution.
It is important to note that although analytical purists might prefer that
the entire mediation be conducted according to only one model, in reality,

35. Lars Kirchhoff, Linking Mediation and Transitional Justice: The Use of Interest-Based
Mediation in Processes of Transition, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE: STUDIES ON
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 237, 239-243 (Kai Ambos et al., eds., Springer
2009).
36. Id. at 240.
37. Id. at 240-42.
38. Id. at 240.
39. Id.
40. Kirchhoff, supra note 35, at 240.
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each model is better understood as part of a spectrum or range of solutions.
In situations where it is easy to build consensus, simple facilitation may be
all that is required, but in more problematic disputes, it may be necessary for
the mediator to progress using full leverage on each of the disputing parties
to forge a resolution.
2. Phases
Briefly, an individual mediation event can be broken down into seven
stages or phases. Stage One is the mediator’s opening statement, setting the
tone, identifying ground rules, and explaining the process.41 Stage Two
opens the process to the parties’ statements, outlining their views of the facts
and issues in dispute.42 Stage Three involves the parties’ identification of
issues in dispute.43 Stage Four is a joint session where all parties meet
together under the supervision of the mediator and get their chance to air
their grievances directly to the opposing party.44
During Stage Five, the parties privately caucus with the mediator where
their concerns can be presented frankly, without fear of offending the
opposing party.45 This additional opportunity to be heard can be a very
effective way of diffusing tension, even though the opposing party is not
present, because it allows the party to fully air their grievances. At this
point, the mediator can begin “shuttle diplomacy,” carrying the message
from each private meeting with the opposing party, in an effort to find
middle ground.46 Finally, when an agreement is reached in Stage 7, the
mediator can assist the parties in reducing their understanding to writing,
and bringing the parties together to encourage a better prospective
relationship.47
In understanding the process, it is important to note that Stages One
through Three and part of Stage Five focus on the dispute and the problems
in the past. In contrast, part of Stage Four and Stages Five through Seven
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

GRENIG, supra note 25, at 93.
Id. at 95-96.
Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 94-95.
SOURDIN, supra note 34, at 29.
RUTH CHARLTON & MICHELINE DEWDNEY, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK: SKILLS AND
STRATEGIES FOR PRACTITIONERS 4-7 (Sydney 1995). Of note, the stages or phases range broadly
from three to nine depending on the author and the type of analysis, but the process varies little in
what actually occurs. See U.S. ARMY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERIES: MEDIATION 17
(May 2010).
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focus on the solutions in the future which will allow the parties to resolve
the dispute.48
D. Arbitration
Arbitration is sometimes characterized as a “private tribunal.”49 In a
standard civil litigation context, arbitration may have many distinct
advantages to the litigants when compared with the more cumbersome
process of a judicial trial. Importantly, the key drawback is that arbitration
denies the parties the benefit of a jury to assist as a fact finder.50 However,
this loss is often of no moment in cultures where disputes are normally tried
before a tribal elder or a judge.
Foremost among arbitration’s many advantages is its flexibility as a
forum for dispute resolution.51 Every aspect of the proceeding has the
potential to be individually tailored to maximize the benefits of resolution,
while minimizing the process deficits that are typically associated with
litigation.52
If the tactical environment makes location an issue, then an arbitration
hearing can be relocated to a secure location, because the key facility
requirement is a hearing room with enough privacy for the parties to be
heard without undue distraction.53 This approach stands in stark contrast to
the usual facilities requirements associated with a traditional courthouse and
individual courtrooms.
Along the same lines, in its simplest form, an arbitration hearing can be
held with a single arbitrator presiding, devoid of staff or counsel for the
parties.54 This rudimentary approach is often not only more than sufficient,
it may also harmonize very well with local traditions where a single elder is
asked to sit in judgment.55 Arbitration also lends itself to streamlined civil
48. CHARLTON & DEWDNEY, supra note 47, at 7.
49. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979), reprinted in ALAN RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE
OF LAWYERS 599 (4th ed. 2006).
50. ARTHUR MAZIROW, THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION AS
COMPARED TO LITIGATION
2
(2008),
http://www.cre.org/images/my08/presentations/
the_advantages_and_disadvantages_of_arbitration_as_compared_to_litigation_2_mazirow.pdf.
51. SOURDIN, supra note 34, at 37.
52. Id. For a detailed discussion of the key comparative benefits of arbitration when
contrasted with judicial litigation, see Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 599-600.
53. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 49.
54. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 173.
55. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has studied indigenous
arbitrators in the context of forestry disputes, and provides the following insights reflecting the
emphasis on judicial temperament and tradition:
Indigenous arbitrators share many of the characteristics of mediators. They tend to be
prosperous male elders, often renowned for their speaking skills and sound judgment. In
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and evidentiary procedure, elevating substance over form,56 with less chance
of prejudice (or the need for more complex safeguards) from the
misinterpretations of a lay jury. Finally, arbitration verdicts are generally
designed to be final, without the attendant delays of appellate wrangling that
can deprive the parties of any benefits or efficiencies from an alternative
approach to dispute resolution.57
IV. TRADITIONAL RULE OF LAW EFFORTS
Traditional Rule of Law efforts overwhelming focus on criminal
conduct, often as the result of some of the most heinous crimes imaginable.
In the meantime, disputes over property boundaries, rights to personal
property, torts, and business disputes are neglected. Unfortunately, if these
ordinary disputes are left to fester, they can boil over into physical violence.
From a governance perspective, this lawless vacuum can readily create a
sense of societal chaos and hopelessness that slows the progress of
reestablishing judicial norms. These ordinary differences are the types of
disputes that readily lend themselves to resolution through alternative
means.
A. Contrasting Limitations of Transitional Justice
The United Nations provides the following vision of transitional justice:
“Transitional justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes and
mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, truth-seeking, reparations
programmes, institutional reform or an appropriate combination thereof.”58
many cases they possess formal or informal leadership positions. Kpelle arbitrators, for
example, commonly hold such influential roles as town chief or quarter elder. In
northern Somalia, the clan and sub-clan sultans often serve as mediators and arbitrators.
The sultans’ process of arriving at a decision is often collaborative, allowing the
disputants an active role in shaping a compromise. Indeed, to be heavy-handed
undermines a sultan’s authority, as expressed in a Somali proverb: “Three things bring
the down of Sultans; biased judgment (in the settlement of disputes), dryhandedness
(meanness) and indecision.
Alfonso Peter Castro & Kreg Ettenger, Indigenous Knowledge and Conflict Management: Exploring
Local Perspectives and Mechanisms for Dealing with Community Forestry Disputes, in 1
COMPILATION OF DISCUSSION PAPERS FROM THE E-CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING NATURAL
RESOURCES CONFLICTS THROUGH COMMUNITY FORESTRY (1996), http://www.fao.org/
docrep/005/ac696e/ac696e09.htm.
56. MICHAEL KING ET AL., NON-ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE 108 (2009).
57. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
732 (4th ed. 2006).
58. U.N. APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 3.
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Analytically, there is a general sense that transitional justice focuses more on
criminal responsibility for government abuses from an often tyrannical
regime,59 than on civil disputes that may be considered less pressing in the
aftermath of the devastation of human rights violations.
The one area where transitional justice may overlap with civil disputes
in post-conflict environments is reparations. Reparations encompass a broad
range of remedies including building memorials, providing health services,
the return of property, and specifically the payment of monetary damages.60
However, the emphasis is once again on the harm caused by the prior
government, with little or no attention to civil disputes that have been
allowed to fester for lack of a suitable forum. The area of reparations is
much more likely to address mass claims administration needs to benefit a
broad poverty-stricken indigenous population than the individual disputes of
parties to a civil action.61
B. Limitations in Current Rule of Law Approach
At a conceptual level, the rule of law is an all-encompassing notion that
societies should embrace justice under the law as an elemental “principle of
governance.”62 Yet, this mandate is so broad that it risks losing track of the
need for prompt fundamental mechanisms of dispute resolution. As such,
there is a defined risk that it can result in unacceptable delays or abject
neglect of many of the elemental disputes that may impede the reinstitution
of civil society. In the extreme environment of post-conflict anarchy, there
is the potential for “rough justice” or self-help remedies that aggravate or
prolong the inequities of an already desperate society.

59. See Nicholas Rostow, Transitional Justice for Syria, NAT’L DEF. UNIV. STRATEGIC
FORUM 1 (Sept. 2013), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-282.pdf.
60. INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT:
CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (June 2012), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/
ICTJ%20and%20Brookings-LSE%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Displacement
%20Report.pdf.
61. Id. at 3.
62. The United Nations uses the following definition as a “Common Language” for
understanding the Rule of Law:
The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency.
REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004, supra note 5, at 4.
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The sheer magnitude of a Rule of Law project can be breathtaking,
carrying the enormity of civil society reestablishment. Policing functions
have to be reconstructed with careful attention to staffing, training, and
equipping.63 Typically, there are basic divisions to assist in elementary
specialization and defined jurisdiction with examples such as local police,
national police, border guards, and port of entry police.64 Each institution
has immediate infrastructure needs, including buildings, transportation, and
communications equipment.65 Finally, there are the attendant personnel
administration functions, such as screening applicants for prior human rights
abuses and payroll functions of salary based on shift scheduling.66
Similarly, the judiciary has the same type of requirements for supporting
infrastructure as other nascent institutions, but its need for highly skilled
judges and clerical personnel can be especially difficult to rapidly
reconstitute at the conclusion of hostilities.67 Often, the judiciary that served
63. In evaluating policing functions the United Nations specifically considers factors such as:
Effectiveness and efficiency; Public confidence; Integrity, transparency and accountability;
Treatment of members of vulnerable groups; Material resources; Human resources; and
Administrative and management capacity. UNITED NATIONS, RULE OF LAW INDICATORS:
IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE
AND
PROJECT
TOOLS
6-7
(1st
ed.
2011),
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf [hereinafter RULE
OF LAW INDICATORS].
64. For example, U.S. Forces in Iraq assisted with establishing a series of specialized security
forces including National Police (later Federal Police), Iraqi Police Service, Traffic Police, River
Police, Border Police, Oil Police, and Facilities Protection Services. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: DECEMBER 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT 2008,
at
43,
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Master_9204_29Jan10_FINAL_SIGNED.pdf
(last modified Jan. 29, 2010).
65. Infrastructure problems were flagged to Congress during Iraq reconstruction efforts. Id. at
59 (“However, logistics, sustainment of ISF personnel, equipment distribution, infrastructure
maintenance, and force generation continue to pose obstacles to long-term operational capability.”).
66. The United Nations Security Sector Reform provides the following guidance on the issue
of prior screening to exclude know human rights abusers from serving in newly formed security
forces:
Human rights benchmarks and individual screening of past human rights records shall be
established for all security sector personnel through vetting: those responsible for
violations, including conflict-related sexual violence, are to be excluded from
reconstructed security forces – including armed forces, police, intelligence services and
national guard, as well as civilian oversight and control mechanisms. The 2006 UN
Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) include modules on Women, Gender and DDR, and
HIV and DDR. Former female combatants should also be vetted before they are
transitioned to security services.
UNITED NATIONS SEC. SECTOR REFORM TASK FORCE, INTEGRATED TECHNICAL GUIDANCE NOTES
53 (2012), https://issuu.com/cprundprsclac/docs/un_integrated_technical_guidance_no/1.
67. The difficulty of establishing competent rule of institutions is described as a period of
years. See, e.g., KRISTI SAMUELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES:
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the prior regime is considered corrupt and abusive, so prior judges and staff
may be distrusted to serve in a newly reconstituted judiciary.68 As a result,
there can be a significant delay in screening, training, and installing new
judges and their attendant support staff.69
Prisons are typically the third key focal point for reestablishing the rule
of law, and they are often uniquely vulnerable to abuse.70 In post-conflict
environments, anger, grief, and a need for retribution can reach a destructive
crescendo with prisoners providing a dangerous convergence of vengeance
and opportunity. Under these circumstances, it is more than reasonable to
provide a critical level of effort to rebuild, train, and staff a nation’s prison
system. However, this endeavor becomes a voracious competitor for
precious resources within the broader Rule of Law effort.
C. Extended Rule of Law Timelines
Due to the enormity of the task, Rule of Law initiatives can often bog
down, being perceived as slow, plodding, and often ill-suited to the full
spectrum of conflict resolution.71 Afghanistan provides key insight as a case
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND LESSONS LEARNT, 37 WORLD BANK SOC. DEV. PAPERS SERIES 18
n.34 (Oct. 2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/ WP37_web.pdf.
68. In considering the effect of corruption on the judiciary, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman
makes the following recommendation: “Review the training and integrity of law enforcement
officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors. This may involve mass firings followed by
universal training opportunities (with testing) before people are hired or rehired. International aid
can help integrate former rank-and-file combatants with financial aid and training.” Susan RoseAckerman, Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 34 OHIO N.U. REV. 405, 445 (2008).
69. The United Nations uses a very similar set of criteria in evaluating rule of law progress in
establishing a judicial system: Public confidence; Access to justice; Effectiveness and efficiency;
Integrity and independence; Transparency and accountability; Treatment of members of vulnerable;
Material resources; Human resources; and [that] Courts and prosecution services have competent
leadership. RULE OF LAW INDICATORS, supra note 63, at 7-8.
70. Prisons get a few different key areas of scrutiny in no small part because of their inherent
potential for abuse. See id. at 8-9. The United Nations lists the following areas of inquiry: Security,
safety and order; Prisoner health, welfare and rehabilitation; Integrity; Transparency and
accountability; Treatment of members of vulnerable groups; Material resources; Human resources;
and Administrative and management. Id.
71. See generally REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004, supra note 5. The United Nations,
through its rule of law efforts, has substantial experience with the size and scope of the problems
facing post-conflict states. Id. at 1-2. To this end, it is important to note the language used to
describe such challenges, like “daunting” and “overwhelming”:
And yet, helping war-torn societies re-establish the rule of law and come to terms with
large-scale past abuses, all within a context marked by devastated institutions, exhausted
resources, diminished security and a traumatized and divided population, is a daunting,
often overwhelming, task. It requires attention to myriad deficits, among which are a lack
of political will for reform, a lack of institutional independence within the justice sector, a
lack of domestic technical capacity, a lack of material and financial resources, a lack of
public confidence in Government, a lack of official respect for human rights and, more
generally, a lack of peace and security. Over the years, the United Nations has
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study in considering an extended timeline for meaningful implementation.
As noted by the State Department, the broader Rule of Law mission is so
extensive because “[t]he capacity of the Afghan justice sector is so low that
most observers, including government of Afghanistan officials, talk about
ROL development as being a ‘generational’ program, at best.”72
In Iraq, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction also reached the same “generational” conclusion in
analyzing the timeline for establishing a judicial system that meets
international standards.73 The U.S. Government effort in Iraq for the period
2003-2012 included a multi-agency task force with the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs designated
as the lead entity.74 During those nine years, the United States “funded four
programmatic areas at a total cost of about $197.9 million: judicial outreach,
judicial development, judicial security, and court administration.”75
Unfortunately, even as of 2012, the Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs determined that the programmatic areas listed
above were not complete and therefore could not provide end of mission
reports to assist in the evaluation.76 In the end, the report concluded that,
“deep, lasting institutional reform is a generational undertaking, requiring a
sustained commitment and a long-term perspective to bring about permanent
change.”77
Moreover, without donor nation support, attempts at rebuilding civil
society can suffer and quickly lose momentum based on the limited
resources from the indigenous population.78 Festering insurgencies may
accumulated significant expertise in addressing each of these key deficits. Departments,
agencies, programmes and funds and specialists across the system have been deployed to
numerous transitional, wartorn and post-conflict countries to assist in the complex but
vital work of rule of law reform and development.
Id. at 3.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF INSPECTION RULE-OF-LAW PROGRAMS IN
AFGHANISTAN 14 (2008), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/106946.pdf.
73. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, SUSTAINING THE
PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY U.S. RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS IN IRAQ REMAINS QUESTIONABLE 20
(2012).
74. Id. at 1-2.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Although the cited information that follows reflects the status of Afghanistan Rule of Law
efforts in 2004, it is uniquely instructive on the issues confronting any organization involved in the
implementation of Rule of Law initiatives. See U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT
ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/
files/file/sr117.pdf. According to United States Institute Of Peace:
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target new judges, specifically for the chilling effect of intimidation.79
Unfortunately, attempts to hurry the process may be understood as “outside
powers” imposing their will on a fragile society, risking little, if any, buy-in
from unstable populations.
V. COALITION FORCE CAPACITY TO PROVIDE TRAINED FACILITATORS AND
CRITICAL MANPOWER SUPPORT
The great paradox of post-conflict environments is that just at the point
where civil society fully breaks down, devolving into anarchy, is exactly
when professionals of all disciplines are needed most to restore the basic
activities of daily living. As a result, Rule of Law initiatives often find their
greatest initial hurdle to be foundational elements of personal safety and
overall security.
Stated another way, if the threat environment is too dangerous, then it
may be nearly impossible to establish a fledgling judicial system to address
the critical legal needs of a demoralized and exploited populace. At this
critical juncture, there is no reasonable expectation that attorneys or
specialists from outside agencies such as the State Department, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), various non-governmental
organizations, and civilian coalition partners could be deployed into an
extremely high threat environment.
A. Active Component JAG Officers
Ordinarily, the Active component would be expected to be manned,
trained, and equipped for such a high threat environment.80 Unfortunately,

In 2003, the U.S. spent about $13 million on rule of law activities other than police,
including support for the Judicial Reform, Constitutional, and Independent Human Rights
Commissions. (As insufficient as these amounts are relative to the needs of the Afghan
justice sector, they make the U.S. the second largest donor to the sector.) Money aside,
relatively little political attention is being paid to the justice sector; the field has been left
largely to “lead nation” Italy, which is widely seen as focused mainly on implementation
of its own projects, rather than coordination of broader efforts. As a consequence, and
despite the presence of some Afghan officials who are committed to reform, since the fall
of the Taliban little progress has been made toward building a functioning justice system.
Id. at 5.
79. Commenting on the deaths of Iraqi judges the SIGIR Report notes that, “[s]ince 2003, at
least 48 judges have been murdered, and the Justice official estimated that they have been able to
provide security for only about 60 percent of the judges and their families.” SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 73, at 18.
80. The Judge Advocate General’s Corps plays a critical role in the administration of military
discipline. See Mission Statement of the Military Justice Section, JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, OFFICE OF THE
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, http://www.mdwhome.mdw.army.mil/sja_nav/military-justice (last visited
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based on the usual career patterns (and youth) of the Judge Advocate
General’s Corps (JAG Corps), the Active component JAG officer typically
does not have significant professional experience in civil Alternative Dispute
Resolution.81 Similarly, the Naval Justice School, which provides the Basic
Lawyer Course for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Judge Advocates,
not surprisingly, does not include training in arbitration or mediation in its
ten-week curriculum.82
Further, personalities that have excelled in the sharply defined strictures
of military law may be a poor fit for disputes that require extraordinary
patience to build even a modicum of consensus. However, as with any
generality, there are notable exceptions, and to the extent there are Active

Feb. 28, 2016). The Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region U.S. Army Military District
of Washington Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provides the following Mission Statement:
The typical actions the Military Justice Section handles include:
- Prosecuting violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Special and General
Courts-Martial
- Assisting law enforcement during the criminal investigative process
- Preparing and assisting in the adjudication of Non-Judicial Punishment
- Drafting of Letters of Reprimand
- Advising, preparing, and representing the United States in Administrative Separation
Boards
- Acting as a liaison between Commanders and civilian prosecutors
- The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order
and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.
Id.
81. However, the United States Army does specifically mention the opportunity to employ
Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques in the Recognized Alternatives to the Formal Court
System section of its Rule of Law handbook. CTR. FOR LAW AND MIL. OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAW
HANDBOOK:
A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 105 (2011),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2011.pdf (“[Judge Advocates] should be
aware of and consider the use of less traditional legal dispute resolution mechanisms.”).
82. The Naval Justice School provides the following overview of its emphasis on the
fundamentals of military justice and operational law:
Basic Lawyer Course: The 10-week course trains Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard
judge advocates in the fundamentals of military justice and relevant civil law, with
particular attention to administrative law, investigations, legal assistance and military
justice. Furthermore, NJS emphasizes trial advocacy skills required for new military
attorneys to serve as counsel at courts-martial. Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates
also receive training on basic operational law in conjunction with the Basic Lawyer
Course curriculum. Graduates often return to NJS from the fleet for further training as
staff judge advocates and for specialized schooling in trial advocacy, computer crimes,
legal assistance, the law of military operations, and prosecuting and defending complex
cases.
Naval Justice School Curriculum, U.S. NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS,
http://www.jag.navy.mil/njs_curriculum.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
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component JAG attorneys that would be especially well suited for postconflict Alternative Dispute Resolution missions, they should be identified
as a critical resource for expedited deployment when needed.
B. Reserve Component Attorneys with Alternative Dispute Resolution
Specialization
In contrast to their Active component counterparts, Reserve component
attorneys in civil practice are highly likely to have Alternative Dispute
Resolution expertise as a necessary part of their practice. Depending on the
state, many jurisdictions require some form of non-binding Alternative
Dispute Resolution as part of their case management systems in an effort to
decrease court caseloads.83 These approaches vary widely by jurisdiction,
but typically include mandatory settlement conferences, non-binding
arbitration, and mediation.
This unique blend of full combat functionality, coupled with Alternative
Dispute Resolution skill, knowledge, training, and expertise makes the use
of Reserve attorneys in high threat environments the best bridging strategy
in the combat zone. Their competency and currency are derived from their
professional civilian careers and their continued, year-round periodic
military training provide their combat abilities.
The Department of Defense could readily track both core Alternative
Dispute Resolution competencies and currencies through its existing
Civilian Employment Information Program (CEI) database, thereby
providing a ready reference for manpower planners to meet contingency
staffing requirements.84

83. The local rules for the United States District Court, Central District of California are
illustrative of typical rules requiring the parties to pursue resolution of the case through some form
of Alternative Dispute Resolution. Note that in the Central District the obligation to attempt
resolution through Alternative Dispute Resolution is mandatory. L.R. 16-15 Policy Re Settlement &
ADR. It is the policy of the Court to encourage disposition of civil litigation by settlement when
such is in the best interest of the parties. The Court favors any reasonable means to accomplish this
goal. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to the contrary. The parties are urged first to discuss
and to attempt to reach settlement among themselves without resort to these procedures. It is also
the policy of the Court that unless an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Procedure is selected by
the parties, the judge assigned to preside over the civil case (the trial judge) may participate in
facilitating settlement. L.R. 16-15.1 Proceedings Mandatory. Unless exempted by the trial judge,
the parties in each civil case shall participate in one of the ADR Procedures set forth in this rule or as
otherwise approved by the trial judge. C.D. Cal. R. 16-15, 16-15.1 (based on the authority of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16).
84. Master Sergeant Bob Haskell, Reserve Component Civilian Employment Information
Program
Begins,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Mar.
31,
2004),
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=26978 (“The database is called the Civilian
Employment Information Program, and it is the way for all Guard and Reserve members to comply
with the law that requires them to inform DoD of who employs them and how they are employed
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C. State Department Attorneys and Trained Negotiators
As the threat decreases and basic stability operations take hold, Rule of
Law efforts should progress beyond a primary effort by uniformed combat
capable personnel. At this point, coalition force leadership should shift the
emphasis to a whole of government approach.
At its essence, rule of law is a governance issue, which would suggest
that in the context of the United States, the State Department should take the
lead at the earliest opportunity, based on improvements in security and gains
in stabilization.
It should also be noted that this does not mean the environment needs to
be absolutely devoid of any personal risk of physical danger, but rather,
there should be sufficient security so that non-combatants can move and
function with a fair expectation of their own personal safety. In fact, State
Department personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan have acquitted
themselves very well, facing dangerous environments on a daily basis, as
they worked to reestablish civil society.
In Afghanistan, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides critical support for
Rule of Law efforts “by helping the Afghan government to develop a formal
justice sector with efficient, capable, and independent legal institutions, and
by helping Afghan citizens to access justice mechanisms and understand
their legal rights.”85
Ideally, the State Department would program Alternative Dispute
Resolution initiatives at the outset of their broader long-term Rule of Law
efforts to provide a “quick win” in initial civil society calming efforts.
Although there is significant civilian Alternative Dispute Resolution
expertise and capacity resident within the federal government,86 this is an
when not performing their military duties.”). See also 10 U.S.C. § 10204(a)(4) (2006) (requiring
that the Secretary maintain current records of a Reservist’s “[c]ivilian occupational skills”).
85. Rule
of
Law
Programs
in
Afghanistan
Fact
Sheet,
STATE.GOV,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). However, it is important to
make the distinction that the thrust of this effort is primarily criminal justice with an emphasis on
major crimes, gender justice, and long-term legal education. Id. (sponsoring Afghan scholars to
come to the United States to study for advanced law degrees).
86. The Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Working Group consists of nearly
100 federal cabinet agencies, sub-agencies, and independent agencies within the United States
government that defines itself as follows: “We are the central forum and resource for information
about the federal government’s use of ADR. We advance the use of ADR through: Coordination of
multi-agency initiatives; Promotion of best practices and programs; Dissemination of policy and
guidance.” Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Working Group, ADR.GOV,
http://www.adr.gov/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
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area that would readily lend itself to outside contracting to provide trained
personnel on a task organized, ad hoc basis to meet the specific requirements
of the mission.
D. Allocating Sufficient Security Resources to Source Safe Movement and
Operations Throughout the Battle Space
Although recent coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have included
significant logistical planning for life support areas to sustain additional nonmilitary personnel with showers, lavatories, dining facilities and sleeping
quarters, secure transportation can be problematic.87 Moreover, American
experiences with contracted security like Blackwater USA have proven
mixed at best.88 The use of lethal force by private contractors can raise
significant legal issues, provide an unnecessary source of friction with the
local populace, and cause severe command and control concerns for
coalition forces because contractors often operate outside of the established
military chain of command.89
In contrast, if military manpower planners are tasked with sourcing and
providing military personnel to handle personal security detachment (PSD)
missions, and the overall mission of providing movement to alternative
dispute personnel is designed into the larger rebuilding governance effort,
then this critical element will be properly supported. This would have the
advantage that PSD ground movements in the battle space would be fully
coordinated, and any aviation requirements, typically for tactical helicopter
movements, would also be fully coordinated to make best use of all available
assets. However, this level of support must be built-in from the start as part
of the fundamental planning assumptions, with sourcing tracked into the
various different planning documents and databases like the Global Force
Management process.90
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Action—Hypothetical Relief for
Moldova and Transnistria
For purposes of this hypothetical, the reader is asked to assume that
border tensions between Moldova and Transnistria have festered for years

87. Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prisonin-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html.
88. Id.
89. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf.
90. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0: JOINT OPERATION PLANNING, at H-1
(2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
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and, with a new “Russian Spring,” have boiled over into a devastatingly
violent internal conflict. Inspired by events in Crimea and the Ukraine, a
coalition of Cossacks, ethnic Russians in Moldova, Transnistrians, and
unidentified outside fighters (likely supported with arms, training, and
financing by Russia), have engaged in a ruthless insurgency that has brought
Moldova to the verge of anarchy. At the heart of this conflict are claims of
disputed territory lost during the War of Transnistria in 1990.
The damage has been extraordinary, and after the Russians cut off
Moldova’s supply of petroleum, coal, and natural gas, even a mild winter
was too much for almost a third of its three million inhabitants who fled the
violence, food shortages, and lack of electricity.
Eventually, through a series of difficult capitulations, Moldova has lost
almost half of its territory, but the conflict has settled down to the point that
the United States and the European Union member states have started to
fund Moldova’s reconstruction. Although there is some shockingly lethal
violence from zealots on both sides that refuse to give up the fight, the
former refugees have come streaming back, worried that if they do not restake their property claims squatters will take everything they own.
Vowing not to repeat the mistakes of the prior administration in the
Ukraine in 2014, the new President has rapidly moved U.S. troops into
Moldova in a robust “partnering” effort. The President is confident that the
Europeans will eventually commit both troops and funding, but there have
been a series of delays in negotiations that have hindered the European
response.
The American Task Force Commander (based on the advice of his
senior staff JAG officer) has ordered a two-pronged approach to re-establish
the Moldovan justice system. First, in conjunction with Rule of Law experts
at the United Nations and the American Bar Association, there would be a
primary effort to recreate the Moldovan Judiciary with an immediate focus
on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during the
conflict. Given the enormity of the task, he was advised that this effort
might take several years to make foundational progress and would not meet
international standards for another 15-20 years.
Second, the Commander directed a comprehensive Alternative Dispute
Resolution effort to head off violence over internal civil disputes. Staff
estimates for this second prong projected that many of the functions usually
handled in civil courts could be fully functioning within ninety days and
would provide immediate relief as a bridging strategy over the next 3-5
years.
At the outset, the deadly combination of Russian trained snipers and
improvised explosive devices proved to be a stubbornly lethal combination.
23
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At that point in time, the Force Protection Officer recommended that
personnel movements be restricted to uniformed military only. In response,
the Task Force Commander deployed primarily reserve officers with
extensive mediation and arbitration experience. Fortunately, they were very
successful in mediating property disputes between squatters and rightful
owners. As a relief valve, the Moldovan government agreed to provide land
grants to squatters if they promptly re-settled.
Thereafter, as security improved, the sheer volume of construction
contracts caused contracting disputes between the various contractors,
suppliers, and subcontractors. Infrastructure projects like power plants,
highways, and schools dominated the initial reconstruction efforts.
Importantly, the Moldovans who are typically suspicious of outsiders,
showed a clear preference for Swiss arbitrators. As a result, the Task Force
Commander established a secure enclave for the Swiss (nicknamed Little
Geneva), where the parties traveled to have their disputes resolved.
Thankfully, there was a true sense of urgency by all parties, because many
massive reconstruction projects had come to a grinding halt as these
construction disputes cropped up.
Finally, after two years, a significant number of Moldovan attorneys
have been cross-trained in Alternative Dispute Resolution and have stepped
in to handle all but the most complex arbitrations. When large sums of
money are involved, the Moldovans still look to the Swiss, with many
Moldovan corporations continuing to use arbitration in lieu of the newly
established Moldovan civil courts. Throughout the development process, the
Task Force Commander was complimented for defusing violence caused by
civil disputes, the speed of dispute resolution, and the deep sense of fairness
in the result experienced by a society that had become cynical from
protracted corruption.
VI. SPECTRUM OF TRANSITION SCENARIOS—MATCHING RESOURCES IN A
GIVEN THREAT ENVIRONMENT
When viewed as a spectrum, the assignment of trained personnel to
assist in developing an Alternative Dispute Resolution program has an
inverse relationship with the threat environment. In the extreme, when
existence is defined solely by combat, there is little need for civil dispute
resolution because life has sunk to the most basic elements of survival.91 At
91. The International Committee of the Red Cross often plays a unique role in aiding civilian
populations during times of war and unfortunately bears witness to some of the horrors. The excerpt
below provides dramatic insight into the devastating effects of war on civilian populations especially
women and children:
Women increasingly bear the brunt of conflicts in which they rarely play a part. Like
other civilians caught up in the maelstrom of war, they face shelling, famine, epidemics,
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the other extreme, there is sufficient security and stability that issues beyond
ordinary street crime are no longer controlling factors for program
development. The artful part of reestablishing civil society comes from
successfully adapting to the threats and circumstances between the extremes.
A. Hot Conflict (still too dangerous for anyone but uniformed personnel)
In insurgent environments like Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat may
remain extremely high even after a technical cessation of hostilities. Under
these circumstances, the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution qualified
attorneys and specialists from the Reserve component would provide
technical expertise with full combat functionality. As a forcing function,
moving quickly to reestablish these foundations of civil society with
immediate relief for pre-existing disputes would hasten the sense of a return
to normalcy, obviate the need for self-help justice, and begin to establish
confidence in follow-on governance.
B. Transitional Threat Environment (safe enclave, but defined by
ungoverned battle space and perilous movement)
At the outset in a transitional threat environment, civilian Alternative
Dispute Resolution is best accommodated by fixed-base operations. This
approach enables a rapid hand-off from purely military facilitators, but does
not expose non-combatants to an unnecessary risk of harm. As key
government centers are reestablished, planners should consider the
possibility of locating landing zones nearby to allow movement by tactical
aircraft. Air movement capitalizes on an opportunity to bypass local ground
threats by shuttling key personnel between and among safe enclaves.
However, working from built-up enclaves should be seen as a
transitional approach because it comes with real limitations in accessibility
to the local populace. By its very nature, dispute resolution is a people

forced displacement, detention, torture and execution. But women are also subjected to
additional suffering[,] which they endure with courage and dignity. In many cases, when
a conflict breaks out women find themselves the sole breadwinner and pillar of the
family, taking care not only of their children but also of elderly parents. They repeatedly
risk their lives while searching for water and food or collecting wood in areas infested
with mines or under constant shelling. Family unity often depends on these women who
greatly contribute to human and social survival.
Civilians in War, ICRC.ORG (Jan. 10, 1995), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/misc/57jmkz.htm.
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business and must be co-located as a matter of convenience with major
populations in order to be readily accessible.
C. Steady State Permissive Environment: Safe Enclaves, and Diminished
Threat Allowing Ready Movement with Minimal Additional Security
Required
Once a steady state permissive environment is achieved, to the greatest
extent possible, the original military effort should rapidly shift to a whole of
government approach.92 This creates a greater sense of calm and stability, as
well as reduces any unspoken intimidation that is inherent in the presence of
armed combatants in uniform.
As security and stability increase, this drawdown of coalition forces
should eventually result in a purely civilian Alternative Dispute Resolution
effort with little, if any, support required from the military. At this point, the
final transition should be from international facilitators to an entirely
indigenous endeavor.
Importantly, all of the gains that have been achieved in implementing
and utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques should be
institutionalized, so that they are not lost in the final phase of transition.
92. The Obama Administration reportedly issued Presidential Policy Directive Number 23 on
Security Sector Assistance, which sets out rule of law and support for justice sector institutions as
enumerated goals. Specifically, the Fact Sheet which was released to the public states:
The principal goals of our security sector assistance are to:
1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges,
specifically to: disrupt and defeat transnational threats; sustain legitimate and effective
public safety, security, and justice sector institutions; support legitimate self-defense;
contribute to U.S. or partner military operations which may have urgent requirements;
maintain control of their territory and jurisdiction waters including air, land, and sea
borders; and help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where
U.S. military forces are present.
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests, through cooperation on national, regional,
and global priorities, including, but not limited to, such areas as: military access to
airspace and basing rights; improved interoperability and training opportunities; and
cooperation on law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, combating
organized crime and arms trafficking, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
proliferation, and terrorism, intelligence, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts.
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance, transparent and accountable
oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and
effective justice, and respect for human rights.
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and
organizations, including by helping to build the capacity of troop- and police-contributing
nations to United Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions, as well as
through regional exercises, expert exchanges, and coordination of regional intelligence
and law enforcement information exchanges.
Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 5, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf.
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There is a strong tendency to try to restore judicial systems to their prior
state at the conclusion of hostilities because it is the “way it has always been
done.” This approach squanders the hard-won knowledge and skills of new
mediators and arbitrators, wasting the opportunity for genuine, permanent
improvement as part of the judicial reset.
VII. OPTIMIZING TECHNIQUES TO DISPUTES AND TRANSITION CHALLENGES
In analyzing the use of specific Alternative Dispute Resolution
techniques, and their relative advantages in key situations, it is important to
understand that high threat environments favor simplicity. Complexity adds
personnel, creates additional logistical requirements, and increases
movement security difficulties. As a result, it is this unique blend of
sufficient problem solving capacity, coupled with a light footprint, which
makes Alternative Dispute Resolution an especially valuable tool in postconflict environments.
That said, even within the realm of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
there are clear differences between methods that make one technique more
suitable than others for a given threat condition. Typically, the spectrum of
support required in terms of personnel, facilities and transportation runs
from negotiation to mediation, and then to arbitration.
Obviously, these are broad generalizations, but negotiation can be
conducted in very austere conditions, and may be supported with as little as
one facilitator.93 In contrast, ideally mediation favors a facility with the
capacity for a joint session and caucus rooms, and requires a trained
mediator to get the most out of the process.94 Here, the need for a facility
should not be constrained any further than the creative field expedients of
tents, separate vehicles, or a series of clearings in the woods. Nevertheless,
mediation is still a more involved process than elemental negotiations, with
slightly greater overhead.

93. UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DEMOCRACY 5
(2009),
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/file_attach/
UNSG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy-EN.pdf. Political facilitation can take many
forms, including mediation and negotiation, convening forums for policy discussion, supporting
inclusive processes and national dialogue based on democratic values and principles. This can help
lower tensions and stabilize political discourse, thereby easing the way to democratic transition and
consolidation. The UN, with its ability to provide support in an impartial manner, is particularly
well placed to play this role. Id.
94. See generally DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, AIR FORCE
MEDIATION COMPENDIUM: HOW TO MEDIATE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WORKPLACE DISPUTES (3d ed.
Sep. 2004), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/adr/af-mediation-compendium2004.pdf.
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At the other end of the spectrum is arbitration. Arbitration is best served
with a significantly more stable environment and should properly be sourced
with counsel for all parties and one or more trained arbitrators. Arbitration
may involve written motions, formal rules of evidence, and is greatly
facilitated with some support staff.95 Although none of these issues
represent a hard and fast rule, it is fair to surmise that of the three dispute
resolution techniques mentioned, arbitration requires the greatest support.
The following optimization matrix at Table 1 provides a compact guide as a
starting point for considering which dispute resolution method may work
best in a particular threat environment.
ADR
Technique

High Threat

Medium
Threat

Low Threat

Movement
Requirement

Dispute
Complexity

Negotiation

Requires secure
enclave; Small
movement
footprint
Requires secure
enclave;
Medium
movement
footprint
(including
counsel)
Very difficult
due to staffing
and movement
requirements

Requires local
security

Highly flexible

Low

Low

Requires local
security

Highly flexible

Moderate

Medium

Possible, but
best with some
facility support
and secure
enclave
Impracticable
and slow to
establish

Best option for
a streamlined,
formal forum,
trying complex
issues
Possible, but
slow to
establish and
likely focused
on major
crimes only

High

High

Extremely
High

High

Mediation

Arbitration

Traditional
Court

Impracticable
and slow to
establish

Table 1. Alternative Dispute Resolution Threat Optimization Matrix
Assumption: Initially, local tensions are too extreme to accommodate resolution by
an indigenous tribunal. Note: Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques remain
useful across the entire threat spectrum.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, there are clear gains for coalition forces if they plan
and implement a bridging strategy utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution

95. See generally JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (Jul. 1, 2014),
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf.
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as a transitional path to speed the reestablishment of the institutions of civil
justice.
More specifically, by embracing a new paradigm for conflict resolution
in societies facing anarchy in the immediate aftermath of kinetic hostilities,
the speed and success of governance initiatives will be dramatically
increased. Currently, coalition forces (often the U.S. and other partners)
have well-developed Rule of Law initiatives, but these efforts require a
protracted period of time to construct, can be extremely difficult to
adequately staff, and often slow the progress of reestablishing civil society
in post-kinetic environments.
From a military point of view, the Rule of Law initiatives must be
directed at criminal law in order to create a sense of security within the local
populace. However, when there is a substantial insurgency, and security
efforts may take a period of years, every other aspect of the activities of
daily living must also be simultaneously addressed to speed recovery efforts
during the rebuilding phase. Too often, these other aspects of civil society
are considered a low priority, and as a result, are neglected, hindering
broader efforts in reestablishing the rule of law. Further, military planners
should write Alternative Dispute Resolution scenarios into tabletop and field
exercises, so that combatant commanders and their staffs reflexively
integrate these techniques into their post-conflict operations.
Importantly, Alternative Dispute Resolution efforts should be
programmed to run concurrently with an overarching Rule of Law initiative,
as opposed to supplanting it. This line of reasoning recognizes the benefits
of reestablishing a fully functioning judiciary as a stabilizing societal factor,
while harmonizing the expediency and efficiency of Alternative Dispute
Resolution to fill the void as an interim solution.
Depending on the type of dispute resolution techniques, the cultural
acceptance, and the skill of implementation, there is a strong potential to
dramatically increase the speed of stabilization by resolving differences
before they lead to additional strife in an already chaotic environment. It is
this combination of simplicity, efficiency, and light footprint that makes
Alternative Dispute Resolution a potentially powerful tool in post-kinetic
environments.
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